Bahamas Consultation on Content Regulation

Over the past few months, the Bahamas Utilities Regulation and Competition Authority (URCA) has been conducting a consultation on content regulation. Under the newly-promulgated Communications Act, 2009, URCA is mandated to issue new Codes of Practice for audiovisual media services and to develop complaints-handling procedures for dealing with complaints by the public regarding alleged breaches of the Codes. These Codes are intended to cover areas such as the protection of children, harm and offence, taste and decency, accuracy and fairness, political broadcasts, advertising and sponsorship, and guaranteed access to certain kinds of content and services (e.g. relating to national emergencies and disasters).

In the consultation document, published last February, URCA indicated that it was inclined to delegate this task to an industry Working Group, composed of representatives of the broadcasters, cable operator, independent production companies and the public at large. However, if the Statement of Results published last week is any indication, URCA may have some difficulty in generating sufficient interest from these stakeholders to make this process work. This paragraph from the Executive Summary is particularly revealing:

(...) URCA is disappointed with the low number of responses received to an important consultation that will affect all Bahamian radio and TV broadcasters. It is particularly discouraging that none of the broadcasters took the opportunity to formally respond to the consultation. As URCA is proposing a co-regulatory framework to develop the Codes of Practice, it does not auger well for the proposed framework if the industry did not respond to the public consultation, the first phase of the process. For such a model to be effective, it is necessary for regulated companies to participate actively in the regulatory process, for example by responding to consultations that directly affect them. The fact that no broadcasters responded to URCA’s consultation on developing Codes of Practice highlights the fact that Bahamian companies might not yet be accustomed to playing their required role in the development and implementation of public policy.

Unfortunately, this lack of participation in regulatory proceedings is common across the Caribbean. This is particularly true in regulatory proceedings involving broadcasters. Contrary to the Caribbean companies operating in the telecommunications sphere (e.g. Digicel, Cable & Wireless/LIME, etc), the Caribbean broadcasters are generally quite small and localized. As a result, they suffer from a lack of scale and resources, which prevents them from employing dedicated legal or policy experts – either in-house or through industry groups – to manage regulatory affairs. In smaller countries such as The Bahamas, companies have limited resources, making it harder for them to devote time and effort to regulatory affairs. One solution to this conundrum may be for broadcasters to pool their resources on a regional basis. Perhaps this is a gap that could be filled by the Caribbean Broadcasting Union?

Jamaican Tribunal Confirms Mobile Operators' Dominance in Termination Services

Earlier this week, the Telecommunications Appeals Tribunal (TAT) of Jamaica dismissed an appeal by Digicel of a 2004 ruling by the Office of Utilities Regulation (OUR) that Digicel, Claro and LIME are dominant with respect to mobile voice termination services. As a result, the three mobile operators will continue to be subject to the more stringent regulatory framework applicable to "dominant public voice carriers".

The end result of this appeal is hardly surprising. The vast majority of regulators in Calling Party Pays (or CPP) jurisdictions in the Caribbean and around the world have reached similar conclusions. It is difficult to argue with the premise that all mobile operators are dominant in the provision of termination services. As the ITU noted in its ICT Regulation Toolkit:

The premise is that mobile operators are able to sustain high fixed-to-mobile prices because they have market power in setting prices for fixed-to-mobile calls. This market power derives from that fact that the fixed subscriber who places a call to a mobile subscriber has no influence over which mobile network is used. Mobile subscribers make this decision when they decide to join a network. Under Calling Party Pays mobile subscribers do not pay for fixed-to-mobile calls, so they may not take the price of these calls into account in selecting a network.

What is surprising, therefore, is not the ultimate conclusion reached by the TAT, but the manner in which the this conclusion was reached. In its 38-page decision, the OUR provided a detailed economic analysis to justify its conclusion. This analysis included a product and geographic market definition, as well as a detailed description of the factors affecting the mobile operators market power (including market shares, barriers to entry, prices, etc). As part of its appeal, Digicel questioned several aspects of this economic analysis, including the market definition. The TAT's decision, however, did not address any of these grounds of appeal. Rather, the TAT appears to have focused exclusively on whether the OUR's ultimate determination of dominance was consistent with other jurisdictions. Digicel submitted that the TAT should not rely on the the positions in other jurisdictions, given the differences with the Jamaican market, but the TAT disagreed.